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Two of the most important propositions of the modern theory of inter- 
national trade are extensions of the Heckscher-Ohlin analysis of compara- 
tive advantage: Free international trade completely equalizes factor 
prices (and thus ensures world Pareto optimality), and the removal of 
protective barriers decreases the return of the scarce factor in terms of 
both commodities and increases that of the abundant factor.' Both 
of these propositions were proved under seemingly general conditions, 
although in the context of a static model. 
But whether these results still hold in a dynamic economy has, almost 
without exception, gone uninvestigated in the literature.2 in a dynamic 
model, moreover, there is the additional question of whether international 
trade, even if it equalized rental rates on machines, would equalize rates 
of interest, in particular if the two countries had different rates of time 
preference. Recently, Samuelson (1965) showed that if there is non- 
specialization (and the other assumptions of the Samuelson-Heckscher- 
Ohlin model are satisfied), then interest rates as well as rental rates are 
equalized. 
It has long been recognized, however, that if factor supplies are variable, 
specialization is much more likely to occur. Indeed, one of the principal 
reasons Ohlin (1933) did not argue for complete factor price equalization 
The research described in this paper was carried out under grants from the National 
Science Foundation and the Ford Foundation and was completed while at the 
Institute for Development Studies, University College, Nairobi, under a grant from 
the Rockefeller Foundation. I wish to thank D. Cass, R. Cooper, and the referee for 
helpful discussions and comments. 
' See Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and Samuelson (1948, 1949, 1953-54). The 
crucial assumptions are: (a) endowment ratios are not separated by one or more 
factor intensity reversals, and (b) both countries remain incompletely specialized. 
(In addition, of course, the two countries must have identical constant returns to 
scale production functions.) For a thorough discussion of these assumptions, see 
Johnson (1958). 
2 See Inada (1968). Other articles investigating dynamic international trade models 
include those of Bardhan (1965, 1966), Kenen (1965), and Oniki and Uzawa (1965). 
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but only for a "tendency" for equalization was his concern about elastic 
factor supplies: "There can be little doubt that as a rule supply reactions 
tend to offset the price-equalizing tendencies of trade" (p. 124). He 
argued that, as the return to the abundant factor increases, its supply 
(relative to the supply of the other factor) increases.3 Thus, in the long 
run, free international trade tends to increase the disparity in factor 
supplies between the two countries, and if this increase is sufficient will 
result in specialization and nonequalization of factor prices. Indeed, 
Ohlin went so far as to suggest that "trade means specialization" (p. 125). 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate in detail the long-run supply 
responses of capital and their implications for the classical propositions. 
We focus on the behavior of a two-country model in which the long-run 
rate of interest in each country is fixed, for example, by the pure rate of 
time preference in the case of "rational" savings behavior, or by the 
savings behavior of capitalists if workers ave nothing. In this case, unless 
the two countries have identical ong-run interest rates, at least one of the 
two countries must specialize. For in long-run equilibrium, nonspecializa- 
tion at a common price ratio implies the same rate of interest as well as 
the same wage-rentals ratio. The world price ratio may be that of one or the 
other country, or something in between if both specialize. In the un- 
specialized country, factor prices are unchanged, but the relative scale of 
the two industries will vary as a result of trade. In the specialized country, 
the relative price of imports is below the autarky (no-trade) price. 
If imports of the specialized country are capital goods, the capital-labor 
ratio in the remaining consumption-goods industry must rise to restore 
the old rate of interest, thereby raising the wage-rentals ratio as well as 
wages in terms of both goods. Whether this makes factor price differentials 
between the two countries larger or smaller depends on whether the 
consumption-goods exporter's wage-rental ratio is larger or smaller than 
the capital-goods exporter's wage-rental ratio, and this in turn depends 
on whether the consumption-goods sector is more or less capital-intensive 
than the capital-goods sector. Thus, free trade, in the case of the normal 
capital intensity hypothesis, increases factor price differentials and (in the 
specialized country) increases the return of the relatively scarce factor 
(labor) in terms of both commodities, as well as relative to the returns to 
capital. Since the capital-labor ratio in each sector in the unspecialized 
country is unchanged, whether its aggregate capital-labor ratio goes up 
or down depends on whether it exports the capital-intensive or the labor- 
intensive commodity. On the other hand, whether the (specialized) 
consumption-goods exporter increases or decreases his capital-labor ratio 
depends not only on whether consumption is capital- or labor-intensive 
but also on the extent to which the price of consumption after trade is 
greater than that before trade, for the higher price of consumption goods 
raises profits (the return to capital). If the consumption-goods ector is 
I See also Walsh (1956), Vanek (1959), and Caves (1960). 
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capital-intensive, the Ohlin proposition that trade increases factor supply 
differentials is valid, but if it is labor-intensive, itmay not be. 
On the other hand, if only one of the two countries specializes and it 
exports capital goods, since the interest rates are unchanged, the capital- 
labor ratio in the capital goods industry (the only remaining one) is 
unchanged and the wage-rentals ratio is unchanged. Thus factor price 
ratio differentials after trade are identical with those before trade. But 
while in the unspecialized country both factors have the same factor 
prices in terms of both commodities, in the specialized capital-goods 
exporting country, both factors are better off in terms of consumption 
goods, since its relative price has fallen (as compared with the autarky 
situation). Since in each industry the free-trade quilibrium capital-labor 
ratio is identical with the pre-trade capital-labor ratio, the country with the 
lower rate of interest and the higher aggregate capital-labor ratio (and 
which will export the capital-intensive commodity) will increase its 
capital-labor ratio, and conversely for the high interest rate economy, so 
factor supply differentials re always increased in this case. 
After setting up the basic model in Section 1, and analyzing the pre-trade 
equilibrium in Section 11, we investigate the long-run free-trade equilibrium 
in Section Ill. In Section IV, we show that, because the high interest rate 
(high time preference) country is willing to trade future consumption for 
present consumption with the low interest rate country, it always has a 
lower long-run consumption with free trade than pre-trade, and con- 
versely for the low interest rate economy. In Section V, the patterns of 
specialization are investigated. Section VI considers the effects of trade 
policy on the long-run equilibrium; it is shown that a tariff (export sub- 
sidy) may lead to a higher consumption per capita in both countries. The 
reason for this is simple: Assume, for instance, that the exporter of con- 
sumption goods is specialized, the importer unspecialized. The exporter, 
by imposing, for example, an export subsidy, raises the domestic price of 
consumption goods above the foreign. Since the rate of interest is fixed, 
this leads to an increase in the capital-labor ratio, and to an increase in coin- 
sumption per capita. The increased demand for capital goods leads the 
capital goods exporter to shift resources to that sector, which leads, if it is 
the capital-intensive sector, to an increase in its aggregate capital-labor 
ratio and per capita consumption. 
Section VII considers some extensions of the analysis. In the Appendix, 
the nature of the dynamic path is analyzed. 
I. The Basic Model 
A. Technology' 
As usual, we assume that the production functions have constant returns 
to scale, are identical in both countries, and satisfy the usual assumptions of 
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concavity and differentiability: 
C = C(KC, Lc) = LcC(Kc/LC, 1) =Lcc(k) ( 
Z = Z(KZ, LU) LZ(KZ/LZ, 1) =Lzz(k,), 
where C is the output of consumption goods, Z that of capital goods, Kc 
and L, the capital and labor used in the consumption-goods sector, and kc 
their ratio; similarly for capital goods. One of the sectors is assumed to 
be more capital-intensive than the other; that is, at every factor price 
ratio,4 the capital-labor ratio in one sector is greater than that in the other. 
The aggregate capital-labor atio we shall denote by k = K/L. 
B. Prices of Factors and Commodities 
The economy is assumed to be competitive, so each factor is paid its 
marginal product. Thus 
r = max [pc'(kj,) z'(kz)]; w = max {p[c - kcc'(kc)], z - kz7'(kz)}, (2) 
where r is the rental rate on machines, wv the wage rate, and is the price of 
consumption goods in terms of capital, which, if there is no specialization, 
is5 z'(k,)/c'(k,). If specialization occurs, then the price will be determined 
to make the value of exports equal to the value of imports. 
C. Labor Supply 
Labor is assumed to be growing at the same, constant rate, n, in both 
countries, so that the ratio of their labor supplies is fixed, LB/L` = a. 
The assumption of identical growth rates is, of course, necessary for the 
existence of a balanced growth path in which one country is not infinitesi- 
mal relative to the other.6 
D. Savings 
In most of the analysis of this paper, we will consider two alternative 
hypotheses about savings. First, rational savings: We assume that the 
aggregative savings behavior of our economy may be described by the 
4 The assumption of no factor intensity reversals is, of course, crucial in the proof 
of the factor price equalization theorem (see Johnson 1958). To ensure the existence of 
an equilibrium, we shall also assume that both production functions satisfy the 
Inada conditions. 
I As usual, if there is no specialization, the wage-rentals ratio uniquely determines 
the capital intensity in each sector and relative prices. As the wage-rentals ratio 
increases, the price of the good which is intensive in labor increases relative to the 
price of the other good. 
6 That is, if one of the countries is growing more slowly than the other, it will 
eventually become infinitesimal in relation to the other. This is subsumed in the 
special case of a = 0 or infinity. 
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behavior of a representative consumer who chooses his savings rate at 
each moment of time so as to maximize his intertemporal utility.7 For 
most of the analysis, we employ the conventional assumption that the 
utility function is of the form8 
W= { U[c(t)]e< )ndt, 8 > n, (3) 
where 6 is the pure rate of time preference.9 Utility maximization requires 
that the marginal rate of substitution equal the marginal rate of transfor- 
mation, or 
dIn U'(c) + , = r (4) 
Thus, in steady state, 
r=6. (5) 
Although the technologies of the two economies are identical, there is 
no reason to assume that they have identical tastes; neither 8 nor U(c) 
need be the same for the two. 
Second, Marxian savings: In the Marxian model, a constant fraction 
of profits, s, is saved, and none of wages (see Uzawa 1961). Then 
= sr- , (6) 
or, in steady state, 
r - - (7) 
If we set 6 - n/s, the long-run behavior is identical for the two models. 
It should be emphasized, however, that although the long-run implica- 
tions of these two savings assumptions are identical, the short-run dy- 
namics are quite different (see Appendix). 
In the following discussion, we shall denote with a superscript A the 
country with the higher rate of time preference (the lower savings rate), 
and by a superscript B the other country.10 
7 For other studies employing this approach in other contexts, see Uzawa (1968a, 
1 968b). 
8 Later, we consider an alternative form of the utility function. 
We weight utility of per capita consumption by the size of the population; 
alternatively, we may think of 6 - n as the "net rate" at which future utility is 
discounted. From the individual's viewpoint, the rate of return on capital equals 
rentals plus expected capital gains. In long-run equilibrium, however, capital gains 
are zero, so we still obtain equation (5). 
10 Throughout the discussion, we assume 3 :A+ : ( SB). If A = 6B(sA SB), 
pre-trade prices are identical in the two countries; even when the possibility of trade 
opens up, no trade will in fact take place. 
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11. Before Trade (Comparative Dynamics) 
We assume that before trade opens up, each country is in steady state 
(balanced growth). From equation (5) or (7), the rate of return on capital is 
uniquely determined. Hence, the capital-labor ratio in both industries, 
the wage-rentals ratio, and relative prices are all uniquely determined. The 
country with the higher 8 (or lower savings propensity) has the higher rate 
of return on capital and thus the lower ki; hence both its wage-rentals 
ratio and the value of kc are lower. Moreover, straightforward calculations 
verify that the country with the higher rate of pure time preference has the 
smaller capital-labor ratio." If the consumption-goods sector is capital- 
(labor-) intensive, then its relative price, p, is higher (lower) in the country 
with the higher 8 (see fig. 1). 
I1l. The Opening of Trade 
Now trade opens up between the two countries. There are two cases to 
consider. 
A. Consumption-Goods Sector Is Capital-intensive: k, < kc 
Since the price of consumption goods is higher in the country with the 
higher ate of pure time preference, that country imports consumption goods 
and exports capital goods. In the short run the price will be somewhere in 
between the before-trade prices, and accordingly, in the short run, whether 
the countries specialize or not, frictor price differentials between ti/e two 
countries are reduced. But note what happens now: In the Marxian 
interpretation of our model, profits in the high savings country are in- 
creased, those in the low savings country are reduced. Before trade opened 
in both countries, capital grew at the same rate as labor. Now, in the high 
savings country, capital is growing faster so the capital-labor ratio in- 
creases; and conversely in the low savings country. Similarly, in the 
intertemporal utility maximization interpretation of the model, in the 
country with low 8, 8 now is less than r. This induces an increase in savings 
in the low 8 country; conversely in the other economy. 
In balanced growth, 
nk= pz(kj) 
where 
p = L-/L = (k - kj)(k. -k, 
so 
1k [(iPp/D5)z + pz'(Pkz/&3)] 
d- [n - (ap/lk)z] 
= fz(l -P) Cak, + p[(z - k~z') + z'k] '- ~li n <0. 
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FiG. 1.-Determination of pre-trade long-run equilibrium: top, k, > k,; bottom, 
k, < ks. 
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What does the world look like when the countries are once again in 
long-run equilibrium? First, we have already observed that at least one of 
the countries must specialize. For, as we have already established, in long- 
run equilibrium, we have, as before the opening of trade, r in A equal to 
6A (= nisA) and in B equal to 3B (= n/sB). If both did not specialize, the 
two different rates of return would imply different wage-rentals ratios 
and different price ratios. But prices, in free trade, must be the same in 
both countries. 
Second, since specialization must occur, factor prices are not equalized. 
In fact, interest rate differentials remain at exactly their pre-trade level. 
But, not only are factor price differentials not eliminated, they may actually 
increase. To see this, consider first what happens to A. 
Since the country with the higher rate of time preference (the lower 
savings rate) has a lower pre-trade price of capital goods relative to con- 
sumption goods, it will produce and export investment goods. The "capi- 
tal-poor" economy exports capital goods. Thus, r, which is just equal to 
the marginal product of capital in the investment-goods industry, in long- 
run equilibrium must be equal to 3A (= n/sA). The country with the higher 
rate of pure time preference (lower savings rate) in long-run equilibrium 
has exactly the same capital-labor atio in the investment-goods industry as 
before trade opened up, and the same wage-rentals ratio. 
Now consider what happens in B. If B (high s or low 6) specializes, the 
long-run international price of consumption goods, f, must be greater 
than its pre-trade price, pB*: 
3B( = n/sB) = pB*c (kB*) < fic'(k ). (8) 
But long-run equilibrium requires 
B( = n/sB) = r = c(kc), (9) 
where carets denote values of the variables in long-run free-trade equilib- 
rium and asterisks denote those in pre-trade equilibrium. Since c" < 0, 
kB > kc , which means that the wage-rentals ratio has increased. Since 
before trade the wage-rentals ratio in the second country (B) was larger than 
in the first (A), the discrepancy has increased. If, on the other hand, B does 
not specialize, p - pB* so B kB, the wage-rentals ratio is unchanged. 
Thus the country with the lower rate of time preference in long-run equilib- 
rium has a higher (unchanged) capital-labor atio in the consumption-goods 
sector than before trade opens up, and a higher (unchanged) wage-rentals 
ratio if it specializes (does not specialize). Factor price differentials are 
increased or unchanged as B specializes or does not specialize. Note that in 
this model, long-run comparative advantage is determined completely by 
preferences ( avings rates) and has nothing to do with initial endowments 
of capital and labor. 12 
12 If our initial situation is the long-run autarky equilibrium, the country with the 
initially higher capital-labor ratio will also have a higher wage-rentals ratio and will, 
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Moreover, it is possible that the return to no factor in lernis of either 
commodity may decrease, and the return to the factor which before trade is 
relatively scarce may increase relative to the returns to the abundant factor. 
If B does not specialize, returns to both of its factors in terms of both 
commodities are identical with their pre-trade values. In A, returns to 
both factors in terms of capital are unchanged, but in terms of consumption 
goods which are now cheaper, both factors are unambiguously better off. 
If both countries pecialize (or A does not), in A returns to both factors in 
terms of capital are unchanged; in terms of consumption goods, which are 
now cheaper (or unchanged), returns to both factors are increased (or 
unchanged). In B (high savings), the return to labor in terms of consump- 
tion goods is increased, since k' has increased,'3 and, since the relative 
price of capital goods has decreased, the return to labor in terms of capital 
goods is increased. On the other hand, since the rate of interest is fixed, the 
return to capital goods in terms of capital goods is unchanged, and since the 
relative price of consumption goods has increased, the return to capital 
in terms of consumption goods has decreased. 
Note that in this case the Ohlin proposition that Jactor supply differen- 
tials are increased is true. The capital-labor ratio of A is reduced, since the 
aggregate capital-labor ratio is simply a linear combination of that for 
each sector, and the capital-goods ector is the less capital-intensive s ctor. 
Since A exports capital goods, the capital intensity in each sector after trade 
is the same as before trade, but a larger proportion (possibly all) of the 
labor force is now allocated to the investment-goods sector.14 Similarly, 
the capital-labor ratio in B is increased. Consider the case where B special- 
izes: We have already observed kB > kl*, but kB* < k'*, so kB > kB*. If 
B does not specialize, the capital intensities in each sector are unchanged, 
but since B exports consumption goods a larger proportion of the labor 
force is allocated to the capital-intensive sector, so the aggregate capital- 
labor ratio must increase. 
B. The Capital-Goods Sector Is More Capital-intensive: k, > kc 
The analysis for this case follows essentially along the lines of the previous 
case, with the following important modifications. 
in long-run equilibrium, export the capital-intensive good. But for arbitrary initial 
conditions, which country has the comparative advantage in a given commodity 
may change in the process of growth (see the Appendix). Ohlin (1933) and Valavanis- 
Vail (1954) have also argued that for long-run comparative advantage, producible 
factors of production are irrelevant. 
13 The ratio of returns to labor in terms of capital goods after and before trade is 
p[c(k"?) - k,,c'(kh)]/p*[c(kI*) - kA'*c'(kc*)] 
- [c(kc) - k c'(kc)]/[c'(kc )E{[c(kc*) -k c'(k*)][(k > 1. 
14 Since k = pk + (I - p)k, (where p is defined in n. 11), if p increases, kz and 
kc being held constant, k must decrease. (See below, n. 18, for a detailed proof of 
these results.) 
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1. The consumption-goods exporter is now the high time preference 
(low savings rate) economy; the capital-goods exporter is the low time 
preference (high savings rate) economy. 
2. The wage-rentals ratio in the high time preference (low savings rate) 
country increases while that in the other is unchanged, so factor price 
differentials are reduced, but never eliminated. But it is still true that it is 
possible that no factor will be worse off in terms of either commodity as a 
result of the opening of trade. 
3. The Ohlin proposition that factor supply differentials are increased 
may no longer be true if A (the high time preference, low savings rate 
country) specializes. Although it specializes in the labor-intensive sector 
(which has the effect of reducing k), the favorable terms of trade (low 
price of capital goods relative to consumption goods) may raise income, 
profits, and the return on capital sufficiently to more than offset he first 
effect, and hence kA may increase. If, for instance, the country with the high 
rate of time preference (A) is infinitesimal in size relative to the other 
country, then the other country's capital-labor ratio is changed infinitesi- 
mally; A, however, specializes in producing consumption goods, and 
since 8 - pB*c'(kA), if pB* is sufficiently larger than pi*, kA > kA*. 
SincekB - kB*, kR - kA < kB* - kA*. 
IV. Social Welfare and Changes in Long-Run Consumption Per Capita 
We shall now show that the opening of free trade may result in a lowering 
of long-run consumption per capita. First, we consider the special case of 
a small country in a large world, so that the country has no effect on 
international prices. In figure 2 we have plotted the before (dotted line) 
and after (solid line) relationship between long-run consumption per 
capita and the rate of interest.15 Since in the long run, r is equal to the pure 
rate of time preference (or in the Marxian model, to n/s), we can immediately 
15 The before-trade curve is derived as usual: k. = z'-k(r) = k_(r), k'(r) < 0. 
Before trade, there cannot be specialization, so kc is uniquely determined by k, and 
is monotonic; kc = kjr), kc(r) < 0. Balanced growth without trade implies 
{[k - k,(r)]/[k(r) - k(r)],z[kz(r)] nk, which can be solved for k(r). Then c= 
[k(r) - k-(r)]/[k(r) - kz(r)]c[k,(r)] c(r). Straightforward calculation shows that 
c(r) attains a maximum at r = n, the golden rule, and is monotonic on either side of 
r = n. The after-trade curve is derived as follows: Denote by r the equilibrium rental 
rate in the large country. Then if k, < kh, and if r < P, the small country specializes in 
consumption goods, and c(r) = c[k(r)] -nk(r) where k(r) c'-1(r/j3). If r > 5, the 
small country specializes in capital goods, so c(r) = {z[k(r)] -nk(r)]j/p where k(r)= 
z'1(r). If r = , then long-run consumption per capita depends on the allocation of 
the labor force between the two sectors: c(r) = {pz(kz) + (1 - p)fi(c(kc) - n[pk. + 
(1 - p)kj]j/3, where p = (k - kj1(kz- kj) and where kc, and k. are determined by 
r. Then dc/dp = [z - c - n(kz -kj]lp = [(k_ - kjQ - n)]/fi < 0 if kZ < k, 
r > n. For one value of p, the small country neither exports nor imports: c has 
exactly the same value as before trade. Similarly for k, < k, except now for r < r, 
the small country exports capital goods and for r > r, it imports capital goods. 
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FIG. 2. Consumption per capita pre-trade and after trade 
determine the equilibrium per capita consumption. Note that if the rate 
of time preference in the small country is larger than in the "rest of the 
world" per capita consumption falls, while if the opposite is true it rises. 
Should we, therefore, conclude that the opening of trade may have lowered 
social welfare? Obviously not. The opening of trade has unambiguously 
increased the consumption possibility set of the economy (if r : ?), and 
therefore the country is unambiguously better off. What has happened is 
that the opening of trade has changed the pattern of consumption over 
time, and more consumption may be taken earlier (if the country has a 
higher rate of time preference than the rest of the world). This provides 
another example of the fallacy of looking at long-run (steady-state) 
consumption per capita to measure welfare. 
More generally, since the long-run equilibrium values of r after trade 
are the same as before trade, the country with the high rate of time prefer- 
ence has an equilibrium consumption per capita lower after trade than 
before, and conversely for the other country, independent of assumptions 
about capital intensity. 
The results of this and the preceding section are summarized in table 1. 
V. Long-Run Patterns of Specialization 
Many of the results discussed in the previous section depended on the pattern 
of specialization. For the given technology, this depends on rates of time 
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preference (savings behavior) as well as the relative sizes of the two econo- 
mies. In this section we briefly investigate the patterns of specialization. 
We begin by deriving the long-run excess demand curves for, say, 
capital goods, D(pi), in each country (in per capita terms). It will have 
three regions: If the price of capital goods relative to consumption goods 
is very low, the country specializes in consumption goods, and hence 
demands capital goods; conversely if the relative price of capital goods is 
very high. Only at p = pi* can the country not specialize. More precisely, 
the demand curve is given by 
(nc f 1WA/p > pi* 
DiOfi= [nc'fl-Si/pi*), z[z'-'(3i)]i_ nz'-(Si)] I5 pi* (10) 
lz[z'- 1( n-i)i-nz'1(Si) p < pi*. 
International equilibrium requires LADA = -LBDB, or, since LB/LA = a, 
D A(pi) = -aD B~i) ( 1 
That a solution exists is guaranteed by the continuity of the demand func- 
tions; indeed, from what we have already shown, it is clear that the solu- 
tion j is such that pA* > I > pB* (if kc > k,; if kc < kz, reverse the 
inequalities). The three possible patterns of specialization are given by 
figure 3for k, > k .16 
The equilibrium values for kA, kB, j, and DA in the three situations are 
then given by table 2.17 
TABLE 2 
DETERMINATION OF LONG-RUN EQUILIBRIUM VALUES FOR ALTERNATIVE PATTERNS OF 
SPECIALIZATION: kc > k, 
Country A Specializes, Both Country B Specializes, 
Country B Does Not Specialize Country A Does Not 
pB* PA* > i> pB* = A* 
D = z(kA) - nkA DA - z(kA) - nkA D = ankB 
~~A = = /54 = - ~~~~~~~~~D A + kzkA kA-kA P kA* = Z'- 1(8A) A A* = Z-1(A) kA = + Z(- - c 
DAla - z(k B*)/kB(kB kB) DA kB = c'1(6B/p) kB Z - C C) kB k /-1ali n - z(kB)/(kB kB) an 
kg = kgB* = Z'-1(aB p = 8 Ic'(kB) kA = kA* Z-1(8A) 
k-B =B* kA = kA* 
16 The diagrams for k, < kz are perfectly analogous, and hence are omitted. 
17 The solution of each of these sets of equations is straightforward. In the first 
column, we immediately know fi and kA; knowing kA, we can solve for DA and thus 
for kB. In the second set, we again immediately know kA; we therefore can calculate 
kB and DA, and hence fi. In the final column, we know fi, and can immediately calcu- 
late kB. Knowing that, we can calculate DA and kA. The case of k, < k, is identical; 
simply reverse the superscripts A and B. 
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FIG. 4.-Patterns of long-run specialization: left, rational savings behavior (k, > ks); 
right, Marxian savings behavior (k) > k). 
How does the pattern of specialization depend on SA and 8B In figure 4
we have depicted the patterns of specialization for fixed a, for the case kd < 
kSa The boundary between the situation where only the economy with the 
low rate of time preference (high savings rate) specializes and where both 
specialize is given by (if k e > w ar 
g(ieA, bB, (2) = z(A) - ncA - ankB = 0, (12) 
where 
LA V '-(A)(1a 
and 
kB = /1(12b) 
and where j5-pA*, where pA* is the pre-trade price in country A (high 
rate of time preference). Thus 
d8B _(afB 5jI I 
jjSA - n)-an. z( j [an/c'(kB)fi] > 0, 
d8A a~ab = A andcdz)/z(kA 
provided kz < k~, since then as k~ increases, jp decreases, and as i^ de- 
creases ,kB decreases. 
Similarly, the boundary, between the situation where only the economy 
with the high rate of time preference (low savings ratp) specializes and 
where both specialize, is given by equation (12), where again LA and kB are 
given by (12a) and (12b), but nowj -9 pBthe pre-trade price in the second 
country. Thus 
cdhB _(SA - n)/z"(kcA) >0 
d0=~0 an(dk0/Idkz)/z'(kc)>0 
Finally, we observe that if F(D(A, 8B, i) > 0 when i~-pA*, then A 
does not specialize, and if F(D(A, 83B, i^) < 0 when i~=pB* , B does not 
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specialize. Since when p = pA*, p2 > 0, and when p = pB*, P2 > 0 
above p(D3A, 3B, p*A) only the second country (B) specializes, and below 
@(DiA, 3B, p*B) only the first country (A) specializes. In figure 4 (right), we 
have drawn the analogous diagram for the Marxian savings assumption.18 
VI. Trade Policy 
In this section we consider the implications of trade policy for the long-run 
equilibrium of the economy. We focus our attention on the Marxian 
version of our model. The imposition of a tariff, in addition to the usual 
terms of trade effect, has an effect on capital accumulation in both coun- 
tries. This means, in particular, that long-run excess demand or offer 
curves are quite different from the short-run curves.19 In figure 5, we have 
depicted both of these curves. (The short-run curves depend, of course, on 
the value of the capital-labor atio.20) 
18 Another way of viewing the pattern of specialization is in terms of the relative 
size parameter, a. Let kc > k,. (1) If A specializes, and B does not, as a > cc, k9 > kB*. 
From table 2, since n - z(k- k) > 0, dkBlda < 0, so kB > kB* for a < cO. 
Since kc* > kA* > kz*, and /kA = kz*, kA* > kA. For B to be nonspecialized, 
B< kCB*9 SO a ? DA nkB* = . (2) If B specializes and A does not, then as a > 0, 
kA E kA*. From column [3] of table 2, since z/(kz - kc) - n < 0, dkA/da < 0, so 
k < k for a > 0. Since j - pA* > pB* and c" < 0, kB > kB* > kB*. For A to 
be nonspecialized, /A > k A*, so a < [z(kA*) - nkA *]InkB =. (3) If a a< a c 
both countries specialize, and /A has the same value as in the first case. Also kB 
decreases as a increases; but kB = k0* if a = a. Thus, kB 2 kC* ? kB*. If kc < kz 
we obtain the following results: (1) if B specializes and A does not, as a 0, kA > kA*. 
The denominator of the expression for kA is equal to (n - 5A) + [(BA _ z)/(kz- k)] 
= (n - 5A) - (z - rkz + rkc)/(kz - kc) < 0, since by assumption 3A > n. Thus, 
d/AIda < 0, so /A < kA*. Since k B* < k B* < k *, and kB = k *, kB > k B*. For 
A to be nonspecialized, kA > k*A, so 1/a ? DB nk A*- 1/a'. (2) If A specializes and 
B does not, as a x co, kB > kB*. As before, it can be shown that dABIda > 0. For B 
to be nonspecialized, kC* < kB, or, 1/a < [z(k-B*)-nkB*]nkA 1/Ia'. Thus, if 
a? 2 , kB* < kB. Since p B* > PA*, A > k A* < kA*, so /A may be less or 
greater than kA*. (3) If a' < a < a', both countries specialize, and kB has the same 
value as in the first case, while /A may be greater than kA*, as in the second case. 
19 The static theory of the optimum tariff is thus no longer directly applicable. 
The optimal tariff policy will depend not only on the home country's rate of time 
preference but also on the speeds of adjustment in the foreign country. 
20 Note that the long-run curves are not necessarily everywhere more elastic than 
the short-run curves (in particular, if kz < kc). The derivation of the long-run curve 
has already been described. The derivation of the short-run curve is straightforward: 
If kz < k, as I/p (the price of capital goods relative to consumption goods) increases, 
the wage-rentals ratio increases, and hence kz and kc increase. Profits, and therefore 
investment, decrease while output of capital goods increases, so excess supply in- 
creases. Eventually, kz = k. The price at which this occurs is the capital-goods 
specialization price: For all greater prices of capital goods, the economy specializes in 
capital goods. Excess supply is given by z(k) - sz'(k)k, and is independent of price. 
Note that the long-run supply with specialization is given by z(k) - sz'(k)k, and since 
z'(1 - s) - sz"k > 0, if k < k*, excess supply with specialization is greater in the 
short run than the long run. Similarly, as we lower the price, excess demand increases, 
and kz and kc fall, until kc = k; the price at which this occurs is the consumption- 
goods specialization price: For all smaller prices of capital goods, the economy 
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FIG. 5.-Excess demand for capital goods in the short and long run: left, kc > k,; 
right, kc < k,. 
A second way in which trade policy in this dynamic model differs from 
the usual analysis is that, when there is specialization, no distortions in 
production need result from the imposition of tariffs: For the given endow- 
ments of each country, production may be exactly as it would have been 
had there been no tariffs. 
To see somewhat more clearly the effects of trade policy in the long 
run in a dynamic economy, we examine in detail the effects of trade 
policy for the consumption-goods exporting country, leaving the other 
cases to the reader.21 
a) Assume kc > k,. If A (capital-goods exporter) does not specialize, its 
internal price j3A (as well as the international price, fi) is equal to its pre-trade 
value, pA*. Trade policy affects only the internal price in B, iB. As usual, 
consumption per man in the second country is simply production less 
exports: c(kB) - nkB/pf 
If we impose a tariff at the rate (1 - T)/1- (with proceeds spent on 
consumption), the price of capital goods will be 1 + (1 - r)/-= 1 
times its free-trade price, so the price of consumption goods relative to 
capital goods will be 4. Thus, c'(kB)fr7= n/sB. As increases k 
increases, and c increases until kB = kB _ c'- 1(n/i), the value of kB for 
specializes in consumption goods. Excess demand is given by psc'(k)k. Since [dc'(k)k]/ 
dk = c"k[l + c'/(c"k)] = c"k{l - [a(k)/a(k)]} Z 0 as a a, where u(k) is the 
absolute value of the elasticity of substitution [c'(c - c'k)]/c"ck, and a is the share of 
labor. If k > k, excess demand for capital goods is larger (smaller) in the short run 
than in the long run if a > a (a < a). The case of k, > kc may be handled anal- 
ogously, with the important modification that in the region of nonspecialization, 
excess demand may not be monotonic (see below, n. 29). 
21 It will be assumed throughout that the rate of interest from the point of view of 
the domestic producer is fixed. (For the Marxian model, for example, this implies 
tariff revenues are spent on consumption commodities.) 
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which the rate of return on capital equals the rate of growth (the golden 
rule) (see fig. 6). 
Equilibrium in the capital-goods markets requires that demand for 
capital goods equals supply: 
(kA - k *)/(kA* - kc *)z(kA*) - ncA ? ankB 
Thus, if PB is increased, A must export more capital goods, which, since 
kZ < kc, means kA is reduced, and hence cA - (w* + rAkA)/1 is reduced: 
B's gains are at the "expense" of A. Moreover, it is easy to show that 
total consumption (LACA + LBCB) may either increase or decrease. This 
also implies an upper bound on the value which r can attain without 
changing the pattern of specialization, since kA > kA*. 
C B 
I -D I kD r 
C A 
k~o C>k Z 
-B k X 
FIG. 6.-Effects of export subsidy on consumption when capital-goods exporter is
not specialized: top, long-run consumption i consumption-goods exporter; bottom 
left, determination of "golden rule" tariff; bottom right, long-run consumption i
capital-goods importer. 
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But if kc < k2, as the consumption-goods exporter increases his capital- 
labor ratio, the investment-goods exporter must increase his capital-labor 
ratio, which leads to a higher per capita consumption. Thus both countries 
may have higher levels of per capita consumption as the result of the imposi- 
tion of a tariff by one country. 
b) If both countries specialize, then the capital-goods exporter's 
supply of capital is (in the long run) completely inelastic: if kc > k2, 
m*= z(k*) - nkA*. As before, the international balance-of-payments 
condition determines kB, so there is no capital accumulation effect in this 
case: kB = m*/na. The sole effect of the trade policy is to change the 
terms of trade. The internal price in B is determined by 11B = n/c'(kB)sB. 
Consumption per man is determined by c(kB) - nkBlpi. As fi, the inter- 
national price of consumption goods is increased, CB increases. Thus, if 
B imposes a tariff at the rate (1- )/, T = iB. As r decreases, p in- 
creases. There is a limit to the increase in fi: fi < 15A*. For at fi = pA*, A 
will stop specializing. As CB increases, cA decreases: B's gains are at the 
" expense" of A. Identical results obtain if kc < kV. 
The case where the first country specializes and the second does not 
may be handled analogously. 
VII. Extensions of the Analysis 
It should be clear that the results described in this paper are much more 
general than the specific assumptions employed. In this section, we shall 
sketch two extensions of the analysis, one involving modifications of the 
technology assumptions and the other involving a modification of the 
savings assumption. 
First, it should be noted that the results do not depend on the fact that 
one of the two goods traded is a capital good. Indeed, the analysis could 
have been much simplified if we had assumed that in each country there are 
three sectors, one producing capital goods (not traded) and two producing 
different consumption goods, food and clothing.22 Since capital is required 
for production but cannot be traded, both countries must produce capital 
goods. In the long run, the rate of return (the marginal product of capital 
in the capital-goods sector) will be different in the two countries :23 
22 This is essentially the model analyzed by Samuelson (1965). 
23 In the Marxian model we replace, as usual, 51 by n/st. In the intemporal utility 
maximization model, the objective function is now jU(cf)e-('-n)tdt. The necessary 
conditions for utility maximization are given by -dUC/dt + 5 = -dUf/dt + 5 = r. 
In addition, of course, the usual static conditions that 
r ? pff'(kf), r ? pc'(k,), r ? z'(k2); 
w ? pf(f -kff'), w ? pc(c - kc'), w ? z -kz'; 
(r -pff')f = 0, (r -pcC')c = 0, (r - z')z = 0, 
must be satisfied; the transversality conditions yield 5 = r. 
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Z'(kA*) = 8A : 8B = z'(kB*). Since for each country the rate of return 
in each producing sector must be the same, we have 
r = z'(kA*) = max [pec (kc *), pjff(k A*)] 
r = z'(k *) = max [pecc(k *), pf f(kf*)], 
where f(kf) is output per worker in the food industry, kf capital per 
worker in the food industry, and pf the ratio of the price of food to capital. 
If neither country specialized, we would have z'(kA) = pcc=(kA) 
pff (kf) = pcc'(k>) = pff '(k) = z'(kB), which, of course, is impossible. 
Hence, at least one of the two countries must specialize. The pattern of 
specialization is seen clearly from figure 7. 
The country with the higher rate of time preference (lower savings rate) 
exports the labor-intensive consumption good. This is true no matter 
what the ranking of capital intensities, that is, whether kc Z kz, kc " k,, or 
kf Z kz. 
All the other aspects of the analysis may similarly be carried out with the 
qualitative results identical with those above. 
The second way in which the analysis may be modified isto introduce 
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FIG. 7.-Determination of long-run equilibrium pre- and after trade: three-com- 
modity model. 
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happens if we let the rate of pure time preference no longer be independent 
of the level of steady-state consumption? If, for instance, we assume a 
stationary utility function of the form (see Beals and Koopmans 1967) 
U(c1, c2, .., nC) = V[c1, U(c2,. . ., Ca)], where ci is consumption per 
capita in the ith period, and where 6(c) = l/[aV(c, U)KaU]u=u(c c...) - 1 
or in one continuous time formulation due to Uzawa (1968b) U = 
f(, U(c)e-t(1dt, where A(t) = S[U(c)], most of the qualitative results 
still hold, although it is now possible for factor prices to be completely 
equalized. Consider, for instance, the small country in a large world 
model. In figure 8, we have drawn pre- and post-trade schedules of con- 
sumption as a function of r. We have also drawn the pure rate of time 
preference as a function of steady-state levels of per capita consumption. 
C C 
after trade U(C)) after trade 
t~~~~~~~~~~~~~0 be M- ))% 
after trade 
/X ]~~~~~~~~~~ (UC)) 
. / ~~~~~~~~~~ I I 
r* r r, r* 
FIG. 8.-Long-run consumption and interest rates pre-trade and after trade with 
variable rate of time preference: top left, long-run pre-trade rsmaller than after trade; 
top right, long-run pre-trade r larger than after trade; bottom, complete factor price 
and interest rate equalization. 




. ~~~~~~~~~~I I 
r r* r r,6 
FIG. 9.-Long-run consumption and interest rates pre-trade and after trade with 
variable rate of time preference: free-trade interest rates differentials greater than 
pre-trade. 
In the diagram, we have followed Uzawa in assuming that the curve is 
upward sloping (F is the other country's interest rate). The opening of 
trade then results in the reduction of interest rate differentials (i -rP < 
Ir* - PI) and, if the country exports capital goods, wage-rentals ratio 
differentials are also reduced. But if the country exports consumption 
goods, just the opposite may occur even if kc < k, (although in this case 
r is increased, so is p). In figure 8 (bottom), we have drawn the case where 
actor prices are completely equalized. 
On the other hand, if the pure rate of time preference decreases with 
increasing consumption, then steady-state interest rate differentials may 
increase, as in figure 9, in which case, even if k, > kc, after-trade wage- 
rentals ratio differentials may be larger than pre-trade wage-rental ratio 
differentials. 
Appendix on Dynamics 
The discussion of the text was primarily limited to what is usually called 
comparative dynamics: comparisons of steady-state paths. Although the 
two alternative savings assumptions yield qualitatively identical long-run 
results, the dynamic path by which the steady state is approached may differ 
markedly. In this Appendix we briefly investigate the nature of these paths. 
A. Sinall-Country Case 
If one country is much smaller than the other (the "rest of the world"), 
then the price ratio fi can be assumed to be independent of what the country 
does.24 If it were to produce only consumption goods, the value of national 
income would be given by fic(k), while if it produced only capital goods, national 
income would be given by z(k) (see fig. Al). 
24 Throughout this section we omit the country superscript. 
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0 kZ Ak k 
FIG. Al.-Determination of patterns of specialization for small country with free 
trade. 
Since both production functions have constant returns to scale, the country 
can produce anywhere along OABC (the convex hull of the two production 
functions). Since AB is tangent to both OAF and OBC, z'(kz) =pc'(k), 
where kz denotes the value of k at A, and kc that at B, that is, kz and kc are 
the capital intensities corresponding to j3 in figure 1. If the capital-goods 
sector is less capital intensive than the consumption-goods sector, if k < kz, 
production is specialized in investment goods; if k > kc, in consumption goods. 
(If kc < kz, reverse the inequalities.) 
The dynamics are identical with those of a one-sector model with produc- 
tion function OABC, denoted byf(k). 
a) Marxian savings. In figure A2 we have plotted r (the slope of OABC) 
as a function of k. Since k = (sr - n)k, k increases (or decreases) monotoni- 
cally to k, the long-run equilibrium value.25 
b) Rational savings. The optimum trajectory (if one exists) is described by 
the following differential equations: 
_'C ucc = r- (Al) 
k =f(c)-nk--c, (A2) 
25 If the savings rate in the small country is identical with that in the rest of the 
world, the opening of trade has no effect, k = k*, its pre-trade value. 
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FIG. A2.-Determination of short- and long-run behavior of small country with 
free trade: Marxian savings (kc > kj). 
with the boundary conditions 
k(O) = ko, (A3) 
lim u'(c)ke1 --* 0. (A4) 
t Ad 0 
The solution is depicted diagrammatically in figures A3 and A4. The k = 0 
curve is concave and attains its maximum at /k) = n.6 Since c = 0 at 
PO = 8, and since 8 > n, k < k. Since kl/ac < 0, above the k = 0 curve, 
k < O,belowitk > 0.Totheleftofthec = Ocurve,r > 8,soc > 0,tothe 
right c < 0.27 
B. The General Case 
We consider now the general case where country A has v of the world popu- 
lation and country B (1 - v): (a 1 - v/v). We limit ourselves here to the 
case of Marxian savings assumption. Before we draw the detailed phase 
diagrams, we need to sketch out the patterns of specialization. The results are 
set forth in table Al, where the following additional notation has been intro- 
duced: I3(kj) z'(k,)k,/z(k,) (share of profit in z sector), a(kc) c'(kj)k,/c(kj) 
(share of profit in c sector); N = kc/kz, the ratio of capital intensities if there is 
26 Since ck = o = f(k) - nk, dcldkk = o = f '-n, and d 2c/dk2k=o = f". 
27 The only modification in the usual analysis arises if the rate of time preference 
of the small country is identical with that of the rest of the world. Then r = a for 
k, < k < k,, so there is a region in which c = 0. If ko < kz, in the long run k = C; 
if k0 > kc, in the long-run k = k,; if initially we were in long-run o-trade quilibrium, 
with k, < ko < kc, the opening of trade has no effects; see fig. A4. (The modifications 
for the case kc < k, are straightforward.) 
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FIG. A3. Determination of short- and long-run behavior of small country with 
free trade: rational savings (6A : PB, k, > k,). 
nonspecialization; HI,(k,) = z'(k,)k,, profit per worker in c sector; fi5(k) 
price at which country with capital-labor ratio k specializes in z; fi3(k) price at 
which country with capital-labor ratio k specializes in c; kz(p) and kc(p) are 
C 
specialized in 
producing investment \ 
k=O 
/~~~~~o - specialized 
specialized in producing 
consumption goods 
kz kc k 
FIG. A4. Determination of short- and long-run behavior of small country with 
free trade: rational savings (5A = 5B, k > k,). 
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the inverses of the above two functions.28 Elasticity of substitution in z 
sector = = -z'(z - kzz')/zz''kz; elasticity of substitution of c sector = 
C= -c'(c- kc')/cc'k,; proportion of ith country's labor force in z sector = 
= (k - k)(ks-kc). 
International equilibrium requires savings to equal production of investment 
goods, and this is what the equations in the second column of table Al state 
for the various specialization patterns.29 For each particular pattern of speciali- 
zation, (kA, kB) must satisfy certain constraints, and these are set forth in the 
third column of Al. For instance, if neither country is specialized, for a given 
value of k_ (and hence kc), as kA increases, for savings to equal investment, 
kB must decrease (linearly). But, if kc > kz, kA must be less than kc, and kB 
must be greater than kz. One of these constraints must eventually become 
binding. Which does so first depends simply on the following :30 
If N > (<) 1, 
A < (<)kc 13(s vN+ (1 - v)sB) < (1 - v) 
t k 2 kz. Jj1(sA vN + (1 - v)sB) > (1 - v) the constraint B is<(2)k s binding if g (SB(1 -vN+VSA) < v  < k;1 if1(Bl- v)N + vA 
Lk ? (?) kzj L3(s (1 - v)N + vsA) > v J 
(A5) 
The loci along which the respective constraints are just binding are given 
in table A2. It should be noted that if both production functions are Cobb- 
Douglas, all the boundaries are linear, positively sloped, and pass through 
the origin, and hence cannot intersect. More generally, however, the bound- 
aries may intersect and may be negatively sloped. If the kA < (2) kc con- 
straint is binding for some value of kc, it is binding for all greater values of 
kz if:31 
(a) o, < oz < 1, or 
(b) ao < oz and sAvN < (1 -_v)(l - SB), or (A6) 
(c) a, < [1 - a(kc)] and N > 1. 
Sufficient conditions that the respective boundaries be positively sloped are 
28 For a discussion of specialization prices for the two-sector model, see, for 
instance, Oniki and Uzawa (1965). 
29 In general, for given (kA, kB), momentary equilibrium may not be unique. 
Sufficient conditions for momentary uniqueness are that ad, a, 2 1 or N > 1. It is 
required to show that net excess demand, E, equals 0 for a unique p. If both countries 
are nonspecialized, E= kr - pz, where ? = vsAkA + (1 - v)sBkBIk and k = 
LkA + (1 - v)kB, for which it is known that the above conditions are sufficient 
(see Drandakis 1963). The other cases follow along analogous lines (see also Bardhan 
1965). Bardhan also analyzes the stability of this model when the equilibrium in- 
volves nonspecialization or specialization by both countries, but his analysis, besides 
its nonglobal character, provides little information on the dynamics, except the 
eventual convergence to balanced growth. 
30 This is obtained simply by substituting kA = kc into the equilibrium condition 
when both countries are unspecialized, and observing whether the required value of 
kB > kz, and so on. 
31 Similarly, if the constraint kA ? (?) k, is binding for some values of kz, it is 
for all greater values of k, if a, 2 g2 ? 1. To prove these results, we simply make 
use of the facts cited in the second footnote of table A2. 
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kA Bz, Ac 0 UA / B 
kB B* kB 
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FIG. A5.-Determination of short- and long-run behavior of two-country model: 
Marxian savings. Top, kc > k,; uc = az = 1.; bottom, kc < kz, ac = az = 1. 
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FIG. A6.-Dynamics for two-country model: Marxian savings 
given in table A2. These conditions are fairly weak. For instance, if N > 1 
and [1 - min (a, /)] < ag < ag < 1, then all boundaries are upward sloping. 
For kA = 0, sAr = n (eq. [7] above). The locus of such points is described 
in table Al, and the slope of the locus in each region is given in the final column 
of table Al. These results are obtained by observing that, when A produces 
investment goods, r = z'(kA), so if kA = 0, k = z'- 1(n/SA) = kA* and if A 
specializes in producing z goods, kA = kzA*. If A produces only consumption 
goods, pc'(kA) = r-32 
32 The calculations of the slopes are straightforward, with the following exception: 
if B is unspecialized, A specialized in consumption goods; we obtain the indicated 
result by observing that dp/dk, * 0 as k, $ k2, and hence as kA rises, kB must fall, 
if k, > k2(riseifk, < kz). 
FACTOR PRICE EQUALIZATION 487 
If kc > k_ or if g_ and g, are greater than or equal to unity, when kA is 
increased (regardless of the pattern of specialization), for given kB, kz must 
increase, and hence above the kA = 0, kA < 0, below it, kB > 0.33 Since the 
kA = 0 curve, which is defined for all values of kB (at kB = 0, kA = kA*), and 
the kB = 0, which is similarly defined, intersect only once, and since vkA + 
(1 - v)kB is bounded,34 the world economy must either converge to the 
equilibrium or oscillate around it. The equilibrium can be shown to be locally 
stable under the above conditions. Some possible phase diagrams are given 
in figure A5, and "blow-ups" of the behavior near equilibrium are given in 
figure A6. Several features may be noted. Cycles are only possible if in long- 
run equilibrium the exporter of consumption goods is specialized. If the 
capital-goods exporter is specialized, in the given specialization region its 
approach to equilibrium is monotonic, but the consumption-goods exporter's 
approach may be monotonic. Globally, neither kA nor kB need change mono- 
tonically. Similarly, the relative price ratio need not change monotonically. 
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